Cyber physical systems are examples of a new emerging modelling paradigm that can be defined as multi-dimensional system coengineering (MScE). In MScE, different aspects of complex systems are considered altogether, producing emergent properties, or loosing some useful ones. This holistic approach requires interdisciplinary methods that result from formal mathematical and AI co-engineering. In this paper, we propose a formal framework consisting of a reference model for multi-agent cyber physical systems, and a formal logic for expressing safety properties. The agents we consider are enabled with continuous physical mobility and evolve in an uncertain physical environment. Moreover, the model is user centric, by defining a complex control that considers the output of a runtime verification process, and possible commands of a human controller. The formal logic, called safety analysis logic (SafAL), combines probabilities with epistemic operators. In SafAL, one can specify the reachability properties of one agent, as well as prescriptive commands to the user. We define symmetry reduction semantics and a new concept of bisimulation for agents. A full abstraction theorem is presented, and it is proved that SafAL represents a logical characterization of bisimulation. A foundational study is carried out for model checking SafAL formulae against Markov models. A fundamental result states that the bisimulation preserves the probabilities of the reachable state sets.
Introduction
Cyber physical systems (CPS) are tight integrations of computation with physical processes. Examples can be found in diverse areas as aerospace, automotive, chemical processes, civil infrastructure, energy, manufacturing, transportation and healthcare. A realistic formal model for CPS will consider the randomness of the environments where there are deployed, as well as the fact that in most applications these are interacting agents. The agents are used to model entities enabled with physical mobility (e.g. cars, planes or satellites), which are able to do autonomous or guarded transitions, which are able to communicate and with evolutions continuous in both time and space. In the past all these essential system features were studied separately or shallowly integrated. The new technologies like CPS and ubiquitous computing require deep integration of orthogonal multiple features, raising the issue of modelling of emerging or lost system properties. This problem is approached in this problem by proposing a formal framework called multi-dimensional system co-engineering [7,6] (MScE), a holistic view combining formal, mathematical and control engineering. With this respect, formal methods for the specification and verification have been only recently developed, like Hilbertean formal methods [4, 5] or stochastic model checking [10] . The most effective verification method has proved to be model checking [17] . This paper is a foundational study of model checking for a stochastic model of agents. In this model, each agent is a new computational model called agent stochastic cyber-physical system (aCPS), i.e. each agent can move physically, thus it can be thought of as a hybrid system. Moreover, uncertainty is considered for both environment and for agent's hybrid behavior, and this uncertainty is quantified probabilistically. In the multi-agent stochastic cyberphysical system (MAPS) model all agents are embedded in a common physical environment and they communicate using channels. The new model, which is the kernel of MScE, addresses three new issues: -provide real time information about the changing environment of agent based CPS. -represent the information collected during runtime system analysis model the co-existence of the human control and automated control (making the model user-centric)
User enabled control is very important for CPS, where failures or incorrect usage may be catastrophic.
The MScE framework comprises:
-The holistic, mathematical models of aCPS and MAPS, and -A formal logic, called safety analysis logic (SafAL), that offers original specification techniques for the probabilistic properties of single agent reachability. It also contains coloring types and two imperative operators: one of control theoretic nature saying that a discrete transition (a control) will take place, and a recommendation operator that prescribes a discrete transition. -A verification strategy of safety properties expressed in SafAL against aCPS using system symmetries. We investigate the issues of bisimulation and of model checking.
There are two key concepts in model checking: reachability analysis and bisimulation. The first concept gives the effective behavior of the system, while bisimulation means the elimination of the computationally irrelevant states
